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The paper begins by introducing the concept of welfarist incorporation which refers here to `a political and economic arrangement between the state and organised society, whereby the state invites selected civic organisations to assist in the implementation of welfare policy'. It distinguishes welfarist incorporation from corporatism and elucidates how it signals the crafting of a new social contract. The second section provides an overview of the rocky development of state-labour NGO relations since the early 1990s and the ambiguous nature of state-labour NGO interactions. The third part traces state moves to `dance with labour NGOs' and examines the varied responses of the Guangdong local state and labour NGOs to this new strategic direction. Finally, it considers the implications of this strategy for future governance and crafting a new social contract based on welfare without organised politics.
In this paper the term `labour NGOs' refers to those NGOs that orient all or part of their goals and activities towards addressing labour issues such as work injury, conditions of employment, labour rights, and worker education i . They may or may not be registered (though most are unregistered) ii and vary in terms of goals, origins, size, funding, capacity, functions, and degree of independence from state and market. As elsewhere, labour NGOs in China tend to relatively small and task-oriented, and do not seek mass membership.
iii .
Though the term `NGO' conjures up an image of a legally registered entity with salaried professional staff iv , in China with the tight registration regulations, it refers to a looser array of organisations that may or may not be legally registered, independent of government v , and may or may not have professional, salaried staff and volunteers. The paper focuses on labour NGOs because they lie at the precarious edge of state-civil society boundaries in China, where, like other organisations deemed suspect by the Party-state, they are subject to frequent harassment. Observing organisations at this boundary allows us to fathom the politics underlying shifts in governance strategies towards labour organising in particular and towards civil society more generally.
i Ford 2006. ii He (2008: 9) refers to two labour NGOs in the Pearl River Delta that were able to register in 2007.
iii Ford, 2006:177. iv Ahmed and Potter 2006. v Though the term NGO suggests autonomy from the state, in practice civil society groups in China range from close-co-operation to deliberate distancing from the state. Whilst most registered NGOs are quasi-state, quasi civil society-type organisations, the proliferation of unregistered groups since 2000 far outnumbers registered groups, suggesting a more complex civil society landscape. In deploying the concept of corporatism, scholars often counterposed this to civil society ix . It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into this debate x . Suffice it to say that both approaches to explicating state-society relations have enriched the field of study, but also proven inadequate in capturing adequately the changing nature of these relations. The term welfarist incorporation provides an alternative concept for understanding the subtle shifts in state strategy towards civil society in China since the late Hu-Wen period.
vi Seven of these were interviewed more than once.
vii I am very grateful to Professor Zhao Wei and research assistants for the labour NGO interviews conducted in Chongqing, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces.
viii I am grateful for comments of participants on a presentation of this paper at a seminar at the Australian National University (ANU) in September 2014, to the ANU for hosting this visit and also to the Fairbank Centre, Harvard for providing an intellectual environment for data analysis and writing.
ix Unger and Chan 1995a, b; Pearson 1994; Lee 1991; Dickson 2000; Unger 2008; Howell 2012; White et all 1996.
x For a fuller discussion see Howell 2012 and Yep 2000. 4 Welfarist incorporation refers to `a political and economic arrangement between the state and organised society, whereby selected civic organisations are invited by the state to assist in the implementation of policy'. It is distinct from the idea of corporatism as first elaborated in Schmitter's work in several respects. First, whilst classic corporatism a la Schmitter focuses on peak organisations brought into policy-making, welfarist incorporation is limited to processes of implementation. Second, unlike classic corporatism, it is not about the representation of interests, such as the working class, but rather about the servicing of interests. Third, whilst corporatism emphasises the compulsory and non-competitive nature of selected organisations, welfarist incorporation sets up a competitive process for selecting a plurality of civic organisations to deliver services xi . As with all ideal-types actually existing welfarist incorporation may vary empirically in different political contexts.
Welfarist incorporation forms part of a broader strategy to revise the social contract between the state and workers in China. The transition towards a market economy from 1978 onwards heralded the gradual collapse of the social contract forged between workers and the state during the Maoist decades. Employment in a state enterprise was highly coveted as it offered cradle-to-grave social security, considerable welfare benefits varying with the size and wealth of the enterprise, permanent or temporary worker, in return for worker quiescence xii . At the ideological level workers were proclaimed `masters of the enterprise' at the top of the communist, socio-political hierarchy.
Experimentation with foreign investment in the Special Economic Zones in the 1980s paved the way for the gradual commodification and casualization of labour, as workers became employed on time-bound contracts and rewarded according to productivity xiii . The extension of these conditions to all urban workers coupled with accelerated state enterprise reform from the mid-1990s led to the `smashing of the iron rice bowl' and the subsequent decline of the `work-unit' (danwei单位) as a site of reproduction and social control xii Takahara 1987; Walder 1986; White 1987. xiii Crane, 1990; Howell, 1993; Takahara 1992; Friedman and Lee, 2010 (Chen 2004; Howell, 20008; Pringle and Clarke 2011; Taylor et al 2003) ; and third, the creation of a social welfare system to fill the vacuum left with the disintegration of the work-unit. It is this third dimension which forms the main focus of this article and within which we position the state's invitation to labour NGOs to dance.
With the acceleration of state enterprise reform from 1994 onwards and subsequent labour unrest, the Party/state began to cast its attention to reforming the welfare system. During the Jiang Zemin period there were patchwork efforts to experiment with developing insurance systems for medical, social security and pensions provision for urban citizens xviii . However, welfare reform proceeded in piecemeal fashion during the 1990s, with considerable variation and regional fragmentation.
It was during the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , when the political discourse shifted to people-centred development and harmonious society that a more systematic effort was made to address welfare. This entailed creating policy and regulatory frameworks for private for-profit and not-for-profit welfare providers, reforming community-level institutions, and cultivating a cadre of professional social workers. Together these reforms xv Sheehan, 198: 209 xvi Wilson, 1990:59 xvi Leung 1988:156-171 xvi Howell, 1993: 234 xvii Howell, 1993: 213, 223. xviii Chan et al 2008. 6 were captured in the new-fangled slogans of `social management' and `social construction' Affairs had long been advocating for this and other changes in the regulations. Governmental departments were wary of sponsoring social organisations unless they were very familiar with their staff and work, their risk-averse approach being a significant obstacle to registration.
The second initiative was the establishment of processes for governmental purchasing of welfare services from selected registered social organisations. Both these innovations marked a serious attempt to change the regulatory environment affecting civic organising to draw `social forces' into providing welfare. To use the metaphor of Chen Yun when describing state-market relations, welfarist incorporation allows some opening of the cage housing the bird of civil society but only to lure it towards a state agenda.
On the one hand it is about maintaining the political regime by appeasing migrant workers through the provision of welfare services -albeit a politics of interim appeasement that remained far from any fundamental restructuring of citizenship rights for migrant workers in cities. On the other hand welfarist incorporation has a market logic to appease workers and so stabilise capitalist production relations. The next sub-section examines more closely the politics of state-labour NGOs relation up till the twist in spring 2012 when the state simultaneously courted labour NGOs and as in Guangdong province continued with selective harassment.
II. STATE-LABOUR NGO RELATIONS 1990-2011
This section examines the contours of state-labour NGOs since the early 1990s, analysing the cycles of contention characterised by periods of selective, intense harassment and more muted tolerance. Such tolerance was muted in that there was no positive endorsement of "There is no clear regulation saying that you can't work on rights. From the government's perspective they want some people to raise the awareness of workers because then they can resolve quite a few things through the law but they don't want you to do that to the point where workers might get too strong and start striking and foreigners would see this and see that social order was disturbed ". A small number with close links to concerned academics and professionals or external labour NGOs take greater risks, however, to build a democratic labour movement through consciousness-raising, leadership building and worker education.
Up to 2012 state-labour NGO relations have been subject to cycles of contention, with periods of selective harassment punctuated by periods of muted tolerance. Though some labour NGOs and community, city or provincial level governments were able to establish some very limited forms of co-operation, the disabling regulatory framework and prevailing security concerns stymied systematic formal co-operation. The next section examines the politics underlying the curious twist in this saga as the state `invites labour NGOs to dance'. Though by no means signalling an end to repression, it does point to an important shift in state strategy.
III. LET'S DANCE
The lxxii Interview 24, labour NGO, Guangzhou, 10.07.2012. significant as it signalled a systematic shift in approach to labour NGOs, one that went beyond muted tolerance to active and productive welfarist incorporation.
Under the firm leadership of Wang Yang in the run-up to the 18 th Party Congress, TU leaders felt under pressure to demonstrate a more active role in protecting workers, especially given the wave of strikes in 2010 in Guangdong. As one labour academic commented, "If the TU is talking about service purchasing, then this is not because they want to listen to more voices, but because they are responding to a local government call about doing this more. They have to be seen to be doing something" lxxiii . The TU sought through this hub to sub-contract service provision to labour NGOs. However this did not extend to rights advocacy or collective bargaining but focused on more seemingly apolitical activities like legal awareness, training in life-skills, and organising cultural activities.
It was also a way of putting competitive pressure on the TUs to improve their performance.
The ACFTU has consistently prevented the formation of any `second trade unions' lxxiv Pringle and Clarke, 2011: 64; Howell, 2009: 186-189 lxxv The Guangdong Hub for care of women and children, established May 2012, had 3,628 registered and unregistered grassroots organisations under its leadership (Li and Lin, 2012) .
government prohibited labour NGOs from acting as legal representatives for workers lxxvi . As Friedman and Lee (2010: 534) and Xu (2013: 254) lxxviii Interviews 17, 20, 21, 22, 37, 38, 41, 44. that year, to organise activities for migrants and health checks for their children lxxix . In some cases labour NGOs have been contracted to provide services to groups other than workers, such as the elderly, thus potentially deflecting them from their original missions. As one interviewee in a Beijing labour NGO stated, "I feel we are moving away from our goals.
…As [foreign money] dries up, we will move more and more away from our original goals.
But we haven't lost these goals altogether. We still have voluntary hotlines and we still have lawyers who work with us so we can still do this work with migrants. We haven't forgotten it or lost it". Indeed, this organisation had already devised a way of continuing with its original goals by running parallel organisations with separate registration statuses, enabling it to access both domestic and foreign funds.
Labour NGOs engaged in governmental service provision are unlikely to be agencies of social change empowering workers to organise collectively, challenging government employment policies or consciously building a labour movement. Whilst labour NGOs with a more strategic agenda seek to foster a labour movement through collective action, labour
NGOs that come to rely on government funding function effectively as part of a system of welfarist incorporation containing worker dissent rather than empowering workers and ultimately stabilising rather than challenging capitalist relations of production. This is not to Specifically, it argued that the Party/state's `invitation to dance' with labour NGOs reflected a broader strategy of welfarist incorporation aimed at re-working the social contract between the state and labour. This broader strategy has both a state logic of maintaining social control and a market logic of stabilising capitalist production. This strategy required two key adjustments: first, the relaxation of registration regulations for specific social organisations;
and second, the creation of a civic infrastructure for governmental sub-contracting of social services. Aware of the services that labour NGOs provided to migrant workers, relevant government departments and local Trades Unions sought pro-actively to draw selected labour NGOs into welfare-focussed co-operation. In this way they could incorporate labour NGOs in a qualitatively different way into the political system, stymie their radical edge by emphasising services to the exclusion of rights, and wean them off external funding.
Whilst the simultaneous repression of labour NGOs in Guangdong province in the summer of 2012 might seem to contradict the intentions of the invitation to dance, it suggests that this shift does not spell the end of harassment. Labour NGOs have responded in various ways to this invitation to dance, some seizing the opportunity to access resources, legitimacy and influence, others treading more cautiously, and some refusing to dance. However, these moves to refashion the welfare contract raise thorny practical and strategic issues. At the practical level the relative newness of welfare-oriented NGOs means that there are considerable problems of capacity, scale and governance. With contracts signed on a one or two year basis in general, there are serious issues of sustainability both for organisational development and welfare provision. Labour NGOs face additional constraints in becoming effective, namely the structural problems of a large, shifting worker population, access to factories, and continuing governmental suspicion. Furthermore, the subsumption of labour lxxxvi Interview 79, labour NGO, Hong Kong, 09.12.2013 lxxxvii Interview 79, labour NGO, Hong Kong, 09.12.2013 NGOs under a TU-led Federation might be the death-kiss of labour activism, as labour NGOs get embroiled in providing services rather than engaging in strategic agendas.
Even if labour NGOs do achieve the tasks laid out in government contracts, it is unlikely that their activities will make a significant difference to workers' situation and to the development of a labour movement. In the end ameliorating workers' situation depends crucially on empowering workers to articulate demands and negotiate with the state and capital. Most historical struggles for improved working conditions and rights have built on concerted pressure from below, involving an organised workers' movement and other progressive forces.
There is a broader issue of whether a new social contract can ensure a decent bottom-line of working conditions, dampen worker protest and maintain social order. Though central Party leaders have been discussing universalising social welfare and removing the residence permit system, these changes will take time and will no doubt vary regionally. Sub-contracting labour NGOs to provide services is an interim measure in this hiatus, pending other systemic reforms for completing the refashioning of the social contract. Much will depend not just on the responses of labour NGOs but also on the willingness of Chinese workers to accept economistic improvements in lieu of political rights to organise. As for the future of labour NGOs, the current state overtures are both an opportunity to gain new funding and legitimacy from the state but also a subtle means to separate the `chaff from the wheat' and to dampen the prospects of independent labour organising. It is welfarist incorporation de rigeur and repression by stealth.
